Abstract
AbstractWe consider assignment problems where individuals are to be assigned at most one indivisible object and monetary transfers are not allowed. We provide a characterization of assignment rules that are Pareto efficient, nonbossy, and implementable in obviously strategy‐proof (OSP) mechanisms. As corollaries of our result, we obtain a characterization of OSP‐implementable fixed priority top trading cycles (FPTTC) rules, hierarchical exchange rules, and trading cycles rules. Troyan (International Economic Review 60 (2019), 1249–61) provides a characterization of OSP‐implementable FPTTC rules when there are equal number of individuals and objects. Our result generalizes this for arbitrary values of those.
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