Obstacles in European Competition Law Enforcement: A Potential Solution from Collective Redress

Abstract

The primary focus of this article is to review the main obstacles in competition law enforcement in the European Union and to investigate how the development of collective redress could effectively facilitate enforcement of EU competition law. Arguably, antitrust enforcement remains sub-optimal due to the insufficient deterrent effect of EU antitrust fines and obstacles facing victims of competition law infringements in bringing damages actions. Central to my work, therefore, is the belief that collective actions constitute an attractive vehicle to solve, or at least diminish, the inefficiencies of antitrust enforcement. The paper explores some options as to how to design collective redress mechanisms in order to influence the ability to bring successful collective claims. This would, in turn, consider the advantages of opt-out collective actions in tackling the issues related to low participation rates, lack of funding and sub-optimal deterrence. From this perspective, the article moves on to propose collective actions as a potential remedy to facilitate access to justice, to deal with a wide range of legal and economic issues and to mitigate dysfunctional compensatory mechanism of EU antitrust enforcement.