Observer-Based Resilient Integrated Distributed Control Against Cyberattacks on Sensors and Actuators in Islanded AC Microgrids

Abstract

Compared with centralized control, distributed control for microgrids offers higher reliability and scalability. However, distributed control faces severe problems for maintaining the microgrid cybersecurity, which is due to the absence of central controllers for monitoring participating generation unit activities. This article proposes an observer-based resilient distributed control for AC microgrids that estimates and compensates false data injection (FDI) attacks on sensors and actuators. The proposed resilient control relies on an integrated distributed control structure, which restores the rated frequency/voltage and offers the proportional active/reactive power sharing with reduced exchanges of control signals. The proposed control has no limitation on the number of disrupted DGs and does not need access to the attack information. The H <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink"> ∞</sub> output feedback control is applied to guarantee the L <sub xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">2</sub> -gain boundedness of the control system. Several case studies are presented to verify the effectiveness of the proposed resilient distributed control in the PSCAD/EMTDC platform.