Abstract
By a causal theory of action I mean one which makes two distinctive claims: (1) that behavior is not intentional unless it is caused in a certain way-unless it has certain specific kinds of causes; (2) that all acceptable explanations of intentional behavior are causal-in parti cular, that when we explain an agent's act by giving the reasons for his acting as he did, we specify causes of his behavior, so that reasons are causes of a certain kind. A causal theory sees these two claims as necessarily connected: an intentional act just is an act that has a certain kind of explanation, namely, one that was done for a reason, and an act is done for a reason only if it is caused in a certain way. The most influential advocate of a causal theory of action in recent years is Donald Davidson, who in spite of candid self-criticism contin ues to defend the main lines of an account he first laid out in 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes'. In that paper Davidson defended two theses:
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