Obligations of Conscience

Shane N Glackin

doi:10.1163/17455243-20212990

Abstract

Abstract In this paper, I outline and defend a commonly-held moral view which has received surprisingly little sustained philosophical attention. This view, which I call the ‘authority of conscience,’ states that believing ourselves to have moral obligations to act in a certain way does in fact create an obligation to act in that way. Although I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several prima facie objections. I then go on to demonstrate that the principle does not entail any anti-realist metaethical commitments, and is therefore compatible in particular, and contrary to appearances, with plausible formulations of moral realism.

Highlights

In this paper, I elaborate and defend a widespread, but philosophically little-discussed, intuition about morality and practical reason more generally: the view that we are morally bound by the dictates of conscience
I do not provide a positive case for the principle of authoritative conscience, beyond its popularity and intuitive force, I defend it against several prima facie objections
I will show that ac is, in particular, compatible with the metaethical position known as moral realism, which states that facts about moral obligations are independent of anything we may believe about them

Summary

Introduction

I elaborate and defend a widespread, but philosophically little-discussed, intuition about morality and practical reason more generally: the view that we are morally bound by the dictates of conscience. I will elaborate the intuition I will call ‘the authority of conscience’ – ‘ac’ – and defend it against. I will show that ac is, in particular, compatible with the metaethical position known as moral realism, which states that facts about moral obligations are independent of anything we may believe about them. By way of a ‘proof of concept’ I briefly consider two further particular, and recently influential, versions of moral realism, and show that they fall under the analysis given

The Authority of Conscience

Conscience and Realism

Conclusion

Biographical Note