Abstract
This essay offers a reinterpretation of Immanuel Kant’s Copernican revolution and the transcendental idealism that he claimed to follow from it. In the preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant wrote: “Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition.” This essay uses some concepts from twentieth-century analytical philosophy of language to see what sense can be made of the meaning and acceptability of Kant’s proposed revolution in philosophical method. It considers four questions within what Sebastian Gardner calls “the problem of reality”: what constitutes propositional content, what constitutes truth, what constitutes referential content, and what constitutes singular reference. It also examines four kinds of “object of representation” and what Kant has to say about the possibility of representation.
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