Objectivity, Intersubjectivity and the Moral Point of View

Abstract

Abstract Sellars aims in this essay (a) to demonstrate that the moral “ought” expresses a specific kind of intention, and (b) to demonstrate the objectivity and intersubjectivity of the moral point of view. Sellars demonstrates that we can and do reason among intentions in means-ends reasoning, but that such individual intentions lack crucial features of the moral “ought.” Sellars introduces we-intentions as a solution to this problem. He then argues that there is an intrinsically reasonable we-intention (It shallwe be the case that our general welfare is maximized); other moral we-intentions are categorically reasonable if they are validly derivable from this former intention. The moral point of view is the point of view of rational beings generally; and the moral “ought” is fully intersubjective: Moral judgments apply to all rational beings, can contradict each other, are capable of truth and falsity, and there is a decision procedure which can establish the truth of a given moral judgment.