Objective Limits of the Institution of Punishment in the Context of the General Theory of Law

Abstract

The paper is devoted to the examination of a general theoretical problem concerning understanding of the limits of the legal institution of punishment. The paper defines that from ancient times and the first sources of law to the present, punishments have been improved implementing their potential as means of intimidation, manipulation, elimination of harm, achieving justice and many other functions, striving for systematization. The study describes general patterns of the formation of the system of punishment. The author relies on the fact that the complex of legal norms, containing punishments as sanctions and elements of illicit acts as their hypothesys, constitute an independent intersectoral institution of punishment. The limits of the punishment show the degree of permissible interference of legal norms in the system of public relations, the limits of administrative (judicial) discretion, the limits of official interpretation of legal norms and systematization of legislation and improvement of law enforcement methods. Based on the analysis of doctrinal sources and jurisprudence, the author substantiates that the limits of the institution of punishment can be subjective (directly dependent on the will and actions of people, their associations, as well as on specific social relations associated with the subject of legal regulation) and objective (not related to subjective and implementing the true socio-legal purpose of punishment and related to the sphere of legal regulation). The author classifies and defines socially significant legal circumstances to be taken into account when establishing the objective limits of the institution of punishment. The conclusions are formulated.