O CONCEITO DE RAZÃO ENTRE HEGEL E KANT: A CRÍTICA HEGELIANA AO DUALISMO TRANSCENDENTAL KANTIANO

Abstract

We revisit Hegelian criticism to the Kantian understanding of reason as an identity between the subject and the object. We demonstrate how the identity that Kant claims to have attained with the transcendental deduction is not in itself what Hegel referred to as reason. We start with the common search of both to resolve the question between reason and freedom, each one in his time, and thus fulfill the task promised by German idealism to create a truly rational philosophy. We recall how Hegel demonstrates that Kant continued to be attached to the subject and object dichotomy as he establishes an insurmountable difference between them. According to Hegel, Kant succumbs to the dualism of subject and object and, therefore, fails in his critical mission of reason, Enlightenment and modernity itself. Kant postulates that the conceptual determinations of the thinking subject can never be known as being those of the being itself. Thus, we explore how Hegel acts critically precisely within this situation created by Kant. The aim of this work is not precisely an original elaboration, but to contribute to the clarification of questions pertaining to the study of German idealism in the wake of thinkers who promoted a reformulation of the idealist tradition and metaphysics.