O ceticismo, entre Maimon, Fichte e Hegel

Abstract

This article provides an overview of some significant responses to scepticism in German classical philosophy. I start with the exposition of S. Maimon’s criticism to Kant about the applicability of pure concepts to the empirical reality and the influence of this problem on J. G. Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre. I expose the main theses of Fichte’s 1794/1795 Foundations of the Entire Wissenschaftslehre, from the point of view of the possibility of a systematic philosophy built upon first principles. Next, I consider Hegel’s 1802 discussion of the meaning and relationship of ancient and modern scepticism. This will allow me to introduce Hegel’s response to scepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the question about the grounds of knowledge in the Science of Logic. In addition to showing the relevance of Maimon for the development of classical German philosophy, three theses are defended in the article: first, that both the Fichtean and the Hegelian answers accept the terms of discussion set by scepticism; second, that both present internal refutations of scepticism; and finally, that scepticism and its internal refutation can be understood as a thread connecting different philosophical positions in German classical philosophy.