Abstract
The paper is devoted to a formulation of a certain model of group decision-making, grounding the epistemic authority of the group against a single decision-maker. Proposed model is contrasted with models in which Condorcet’s Jury Theorem holds (or some of its generalisations) and is founded on the observation that some of the conditions required for CJT to hold are not only impossible to satisfy but simply not worth being satisfi ed. Instead some different conditions, better suited to model intuitive ideal of rational decision-making, are proposed. In particular, the assumption of homogeneity among jurors or the assumption of independence between them is rejected.
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