Nudging enforcers: how norm perceptions and motives for lying shape sanctions.

Abstract

We conduct three studies, employing diverse methodologies (a behavioral experiment, a vignette experiment, and a norm elicitation experiment), to investigate when and how norm enforcement patterns can be modified using norm interventions in the context of dishonesty. Our preregistered, three-part data collection effort explores the extent to which norm violations are sanctioned, the impact of norm-nudges on punishment behavior, and the connection to norm perception. Using a representative sample of US participants in Study 1, we present robust evidence that norm enforcement is sensitive not only to the magnitude of the observed transgression (i.e. the size of the lie) but also to its consequences (whether the lie addresses or creates payoff inequalities). We also find that norm enforcers respond to norm-nudges conveying social information about actual lying behavior or its social disapproval. The results of a separate vignette experiment in Study 2 are consistent with the results in our behavioral experiment, thus hinting at the generalizability of our findings. To understand the interplay of norms, information about them, and punishment, we examine norm perceptions across different transgressions in Study 3. We find that norm perceptions are malleable and norm-nudges are most effective when preexisting norms are ambiguous. In sum, we show how norm enforcement can be nudged and which factors matter for doing so across various contexts and discuss their policy implications.