Nudging and the choice architecture of offending decisions

Abstract

Research SummaryDeterring crime is often considered to be a process of information transmission (e.g., Geerken & Gove, 1975). Economic notions on incentives and choice have meshed well with this perspective (Becker, 1968; Matsueda, 2013). Behavioral economics, however, represents a source of further insights on offender decision‐making, particularly regarding information transmission to promote conformity. Pogarsky, Roche, and Pickett (2018) reviewed behavioral economic studies of offender decision‐making in criminology. In their review, they focused on prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a behavioral economic model of decision‐making. More recently, Kahneman (2003, 2011) highlighted the dual‐process nature of behavioral economics, and Thaler and Sunstein (2009) elaborated some principles of nudging. These notions underscore dimensions of offending decisions beyond the perceived costs, risks, and benefits of crime.Policy ImplicationsFrom a behavioral economic standpoint, there is a choice architecture to offending decisions that permits various prosocial nudges. We analyze these ideas for possible theoretical innovations and alternative perspectives on crime policy.