Nudges and threats: soft versus hard incentives for tax compliance

Abstract

Abstract We study what induces delinquent wage earners to pay their taxes due, using high-quality administrative data from the Swedish Tax Agency. We find a strong effect of the standard enforcement regime: a threat of having the debt handed over to the Enforcement Agency increases payments by more than 9 percentage points (from a baseline of 58%). When including actual enforcement, payment increases by 19 percentage points compared with those who do not risk enforcement. In a field experiment, we compare these effects of standard enforcement to those involving much milder nudges, consisting of letters reminding tax delinquents to pay their taxes due. We find that a ‘pure nudge’ (i.e., the inclusion of an extra sheet of paper with no valuable information) has an effect of around 7 percentage points for those who do not risk enforcement upon non-payment, that is, an effect almost as large as for the threat of enforcement. However, the same nudge has no detectable effect on the group that is subject to enforcement. Finally, we find a small additional effect on payments from social norm messages both for those who risk enforcement and for those who do not.