Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone developments in Asia: Problems and prospects1

Abstract

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) are binding agreements to prevent the acquisition and stationing of nuclear weapons within a particular region, and to secure guarantees from nuclear states not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the zone. In the context of developing dialogues on nuclear proliferation and security issues in the Asian region, the existing Southeast Asian NWFZ (Bangkok Treaty), the current negotiations towards a Central Asian NWFZ, and proposals for NWFZs in South Asia and Northeast Asia, are examined and assessed from the viewpoint of their contributions to regional arms control and security, scope, and prospects for implementation. It is concluded that such zones provide an important avenue, in conjunction with the Nonproliferation Treaty, for regional groups of states in Asia to reduce nuclear proliferation threats within their own regions, to gain security assurances from the nuclear powers, and to facilitate wider confidence-building and cooperative security approaches to nuclear and weapons-of-mass destruction threats across the Asian region. Proposed ways forward include enhanced cooperation between existing NWFZ states, further international conferences in UN studies on NWFZ initiatives, and civil society pressures to establish NWFZs. 1This is a refereed version of an address delivered to the Symposium ‘Security and Co-operation in Asia Pacific: Chinese and Australian Perspectives’, held at La Trobe University, Melbourne and jointly sponsored by East China Normal University, Shanghai, 5–6 July 2004.