Nuclear strategy: What is true, what is false, what is arguable

Abstract

Abstract Because of the absence of evidence on bilateral nuclear war, or proof of the success of nuclear deterrence, speculative theory reigns supreme in debates over nuclear strategy. Bearing in mind the limitations of evidence (e.g., the historical record of arms control behavior is extensive, while it is nonexistent on the subject of whether or not a nuclear war would, or even could, be controlled), this article reviews the entire field of nuclear strategy in order to identify that which appears to be false, the sources of error, that which appears to be true, and major propositions whose merit is arguable. The article finds it is false to claim that nuclear deterrence is existential, that nuclear strategy is irrelevant to weapon choice and force size, or that nuclear weapons and nuclear strategy are “essentially irrelevant to international security.” Seven common sources of error behind arguments on nuclear strategy are discussed—these include the relative neglect of politics, psychology, history, and...