Nuclear Safety Regulators' Effective Independence: The Case for a New Approach

Abstract

The thesis of this article is twofold: nuclear safety regulators too often lack effective independence from external influences and the best way to address this is to adopt a new organizational framework whereby nuclear safety regulators are hived off from other regulatory roles and are endowed with essential features of independence and autonomy to fulfill their safety mandates. I argue that a properly organized, well-funded, and fiercely independent safety regulator will mitigate points for potential conflict of duties, minimize the likelihood of agency capture, and, importantly, engender greater public confidence that nuclear safety regulators are properly acting in the public interest and fulfilling their safety mandates. Regulatory failures in the civilian nuclear energy sector are examined and structural and organizational challenges to nuclear safety regulators’ independence highlighted. Finally, an alternative regulatory model is proposed with the aim of creating conditions for nuclear regulators’ greater independence and safety-focus.