Abstract
ABSTRACT The article explores the introduction of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) for nuclear energy in the two German states, the FRG and the GDR since the late 1960s. We argue that PRA - which promised to make potential dangers associated with the new technology calculable, comparable and seemingly controllable by reducing them to numerical terms - is best understood as an evidence practice, aiming to (re-)establish intersubjective agreement on nuclear safety through quantification. As such, the introduction of PRA was from the beginning also a political question, tied to the destabilization of alternative evidence practices. While in both the FRG and the GDR, the relativization of the promise of absolute safety inherent in the new method proved problematic, this was an even bigger obstacle in the socialist East. Although PRA ultimately failed to (re-)establish a societal consensus on nuclear energy in Germany, its institutionalization shaped the societal discourse on dangerous technologies.
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.