Nuclear reactor accidents: preparedness and medical consequences. Emergency planning.

Abstract

Let me first of all say that if I were to put any relative weight on the two topics “plant safety” and “emergency planning”, I would stress the importance of getting the plant's design and operation right. What I mean by this is that “prevention” is always better than “cure”. For this reason, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) places great emphasis on ensuring that, even if a serious fault were to occur, the design of the plant and the way in which it is operated should prevent releases of radioactivity that would require off-site evacuation. Thus, while it is impossible to say that all reactor faults will be prevented, serious accidents simply must not be allowed to happen. Our emergency planning is based on making sensible provisions for action in case something does go wrong, in spite of the very low probability that provisions will ever be needed. This point was recognised more than 25 years ago by the designers of the early Magnox power stations. These stations were built by some of the best engineers in the country at the time, who had the experience of the 1957 Windscale accident very much at the front of their minds. They designed the plant to have large margins, and were well aware of the concepts of diversity and redundancy that Dr Edmondson has discussed (see previous paper).