Nuclear Power: Levels of Safety

Abstract

The rise and fall of the nuclear power industry in the United States is a well-documented story with enough socio-technological conflict to fill dozens of scholarly, and not so scholarly, books. Whatever the reasons for the situation we are now in, and no matter how we apportion the blame, the ultimate choice of whether to use nuclear power in this country is made by the utilities and by the public. Their choices are, finally, based on some form of risk-benefit analysis. Such analysis is done in well-documented and apparently logical form by the utilities and in a rather more inchoate but not necessarily less accurate form by the public. Nuclear power has failed in the United States because both the real and perceived risks outweigh the potential benefits. The national decision not to rely upon nuclear power in its present form is not an irrational one. A wide ranging public balancing of risk and benefit requires a classification of risk which is clear and believable for the public to be able to assess the risks associated with given technological structures. The qualitative four-level safety ladder provides such a framework. Nuclear reactors have been designed which fit clearly and demonstrably into each of the possible qualitative safety levels. Surprisingly, it appears that safer may also mean cheaper. The intellectual and technical prerequisites are in hand for an important national decision. Deployment of a qualitatively different second generation of nuclear reactors can have important benefits for the United States. Surprisingly, it may well be the "nuclear establishment" itself, with enormous investments of money and pride in the existing nuclear systems, that rejects second generation reactors. It may be that we will not have a second generation of reactors until the first generation of nuclear engineers and nuclear power advocates has retired.