Nuclear Power and Climate Without Proliferation

Abstract

The analysis in the Policy Forum “A nuclear solution to climate change?” by W. C. Sailor, D. Bodansky, C. Braun, S. Fetter, and B. van der Zwaan ( Science 's Compass, 19 May, p. [1177][1]) is diminished by inclusion of the myth—popular in the United States—that efficient use of nuclear resources is a proliferation threat. Quite the contrary, destruction of weapons materials in spent nuclear fuel by their use for production of electricity in fast, so-called breeder reactors is an essential component of good nonproliferation practice. Depleted uranium at U.S. enrichment plants, which was used by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) to produce plutonium for weapons, would also be destroyed in fast reactors. The electricity produced from existing nuclear by-products would be equivalent to that needed by the United States, at present use rates, for hundreds of years. The nuclear solution presented by Sailor et al. would recover less than 1% of the energy from uranium. Spent fuel would be disposed of in a geologic repository. Depleted uranium—millions of tons of weapons source material—would accumulate indefinitely. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are required for plutonium-239 in spent fuel deposited in a geologic repository. However, virtually no one accepts the IAEA contention that planned satellite surveillance can be reasonably assured for 10,000 years. Moreover, the time required for significant decay of plutonium-239 is not 10,000 but 240,000 years. Since safeguards for these periods of time are not credible, spent fuel must be reprocessed to permit permanent disposal of unwanted fission products, i.e., high-level radioactive waste. Disposal of this waste is essential for viability of nuclear power and is a requirement of virtually all nations. Reprocessing only in well-designed, well-managed, and safeguarded facilities operated by nations with large nuclear power programs, and immediate fabrication of weapons materials into fuel assemblies for their destruction through production of electricity, provide the greatest assurance against a proliferation threat from nuclear power. The du Pont company completed designs for such facilities in 1978, based on its experience in reprocessing at the DOE Savannah River Plant and on the experience of others. Among many important features of these designs was the elimination of accumulations of separated plutonium. Unfortunately, these designs were rejected by leaders of the DOE in order to support national laboratory reprocessing concepts that had led to earlier problems (failures and proliferation) and poorly focused research on “proliferation-resistant” fuel cycles. During this same time period, political decisions were made that led ultimately to cancellation of U.S. fast reactor development. U.S. nuclear policies based on best science and best applications of science will result in nuclear power being used as the solution for climate change and other energy and environmental problems. [1]: /lookup/doi/10.1126/science.288.5469.1177