Nuclear learning and US–China strategic stability in Asia

Abstract

With intensifying US–China strategic rivalry in Asia, an increasingly salient issue of bilateral strategic stability is drawing growing attention from scholars and policy analysts alike. This paper examines how the nuclear arm competition between the two great powers, each driven by its (mis)perceptions of the other’s strategic intentions, and in the absence of adequate bilateral dialogues at the official level, runs serious risks of mutual misapprehension and miscalculation. Nuclear learning, in a way, offers some unique pathways for both countries to reassess their perceptions and find ways to engage each other and modify worse-case scenario preparation for war. With growing US–China strategic rivalry and a Trump administration determined to check if not derail China’s modernization process, one would expect Beijing to assess the situation, set its priorities, and develop strategies to manage the challenges. One of its priorities would be ensuring that bilateral disputes over security issues do not escalate to open military conflicts and risk escalation to nuclear exchanges largely as a result of misunderstanding, miscommunication, and miscalculation. At the same time, Beijing should be open to bilateral nuclear dialogue with Washington, not with an aim of revealing or accepting an upper limit on its nuclear arsenal, but to get a better understanding of the strategic, technical, and security implications of various potential agreements. Nuclear arms control measures remain viable options for the two powers to avoid nuclear Armageddon.