Nuclear Deterrence and Compellence

Abstract

This chapter examines whether nuclear superiority matters for compellent threats. Drawing on the Militarized Compellent Threat (MCT) data set, the same data set used by nuclear irrelevance theorists, it finds that the nuclear balance of power is central to patterns of international coercion. Indeed, the evidence is clear and compelling in simple descriptive statistics. Since 1945, nuclear-armed states have issued forty-nine compellent threats against nuclear inferior states and zero compellent threats against nuclear superior states. For nuclear-armed powers, therefore, in this sample of data, nuclear superiority has been a necessary condition for even attempting compellence. Compellence may be more difficult than deterrence, as others have maintained, but this chapter demonstrates that engaging in nuclear compellence from a position of inferiority is even harder still. In short, nuclear superiority deters compellence.