Nuclear Crisis as a Multi-stage Threat Game: Toward an Agenda for Comparative Research

Abstract

This investigation focuses on whether nuclear crises can be represented as a series of events with an essentially similar structure. Analysis of superpower crisis interactions, which provides a point of departure for development of a general model, unfolds in four stages. First, literature on deterrence is used to identify problems encountered in previous efforts to obtain cumulative knowledge about the superpower and other rivalries. The second phase introduces the Multi-stage Threat Game (MTG), which achieves progress in two ways: the MTG sidesteps the obstacles encountered by studies of deterrence and is more realistic than existing, single-phase models of superpower rivalry in crises. Third, propositions about the relative consistency of payoffs in the MTG are derived and possibilities for testing are identified. The fourth and final task is to assess the MTG's potential contribution to knowledge about superpower crisis interactions.