NPM's “Ideals” About the Accountability and Control of Outsourced Activities: Tough, But Realizable, Or A Utopian Dream?

Abstract

Based on 25 cases, the accountability and control processes of activities outsourced by municipalities in the Netherlands are analysed. The focus is twofold: on the accountability and control processes between the external party and the municipality, and on the role played by councillors (elected politicians). The research shows that the typical accountability and control relationship in this context is characterised by a low emphasis on outputs. However, detailed financial information and frequent informal contacts between civil servants (on behalf of the Executives) and the external party are very important. Furthermore, the accountability and control relationship with respect to (activities and) outputs seems to be rather loose, also when ‘proper’ output information is available in accounting documents. Finally, trust is crucial in the relationship, a notion which is not advocated by NPM and its underlying principal‐agent theory.