Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles: Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes Are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging

Abstract

Notice of Violation of IEEE Publication Principles<br><br> “Data Trading with a Monopoly Social Network: Outcomes are Mostly Privacy Welfare Damaging” <br><br> by Ranjan Pal, Junhui Li, Yixuan Wang, Mingyan Liu, Swades De, and Jon Crowcroft in the IEEE Networking Letters, Volume: 2, Issue: 4, October 2020<br> After careful and considered review of the content and authorship of this paper by a duly constituted expert committee, this paper has been found to be in violation of IEEE’s Publication Principles. <br> This paper is a duplication of the original text from the paper cited below. The original text was copied with insufficient attribution and without permission.<br> Due to the nature of this violation, reasonable effort should be made to remove all past references to this paper, and future references should be made to the following article:<br><br> "Too Much Data: Prices and Inefficiencies in Data Markets"<br><br> by Daron Acemoglu, Ali Makhdoumi, Azarakhsh Malekian, and Asuman Ozdaglar NBER Working Paper No. 26296, September 2019<br><br> <br/> This letter argues that data of strategic individuals with heterogeneous privacy valuations in a distributed online social network (e.g., Facebook) will be under-priced, if traded in a monopoly buyer setting, and will lead to diminishing utilitarian welfare. This result, for a <italic xmlns:mml="http://www.w3.org/1998/Math/MathML" xmlns:xlink="http://www.w3.org/1999/xlink">certain family</i> of online community data trading problems, is in stark contrast to a popular information economics intuition that increased amounts of end-user data signals in a data market improves its efficiency. Our proposed theory paves the way for a future (counter-intuitive) analysis of data trading oligopoly markets for online social networks (OSNs).