Abstract
Abstract In the first part of the paper, we show that C&R’s axioms generate the following dilemma. On the one hand, they could admit that truths about future contingents have no real ground in reality. To reject the requirement of grounding, however, goes against the intuitions of most philosophers concerning truth. On the other hand, C&R could give up bivalence for future contingents at the cost of making their temporal logic more complicated and presumably losing certain theorems. In the second part, we evaluate C&R’s relativistic generalization of the growing block by discussing the various options that can be used to make relativity cohere with the growing block, and we illustrate the reasons why Stein’s “pointy present” looks preferable to bow-tie presentism.
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