Notes toward a Theory of Style

Abstract

THE RESOURCES OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE make possible certain kinds of rhetorical treatment of issues. I hope very quickly to revert to a more straightforward treatment, but I want to begin by stating categorically, is no such as Since art historical profession quite literally depends on concept of style, I should hastily draw on other resources of language and shift emphasis a bit: is no such as This emendation may not entirely suffice. Style remains just as important to profession whatever tricks of emphasis we might use. Yet it really isn't a trick. It is quite literally true that there is no such as and many of difficulties in formulating a useable theory of grow precisely out of fact that our common usage has come to speak of it as though it were a and men only its agents. Perhaps, then, we had better begin by a reformulation of phenomenon that we call style. For it is true that works of art do not exist in freely chosen forms but that they resemble each other in certain clearly identifiable groupings, that changes that take place are not random but, generally speaking, orderly and intelligible. We have given these groupings name and it is a convenient shorthand if we remember what we are talking about. Unfortunately we usually do not remember what reference of word is. The words Renaissance style ought to be a shorthand reference for statement, characteristics shared by works of art produced by Italian artists during a given period of time. But incorrigibly we assume that words, particularly nouns, refer to things. We presuppose a even if we do not know what it is, so we assume there is a thing called the Italian Renaissance Let us not play with words and let us particularly try to avoid reviving old quarrel between realists and nominalists. It would be better to stick more closely to problems of art history. I am convinced that this thingifying, this hypostatization of basic concepts, has been decisive for our professional work. Reducing concepts to is not, however, whole problem. It is rather what we do with these things in program of contemporary academic mind. The basic assumption, unexamined presupposition of contemporary academic mind, is still basically linear and causal. All have causes and causes have causes and true nature of a is understood by discovering its causes, preferably in infinite regress. This certainly does not describe all our professional research, but it describes enough to be disturbing and it describes nearly all teaching of discipline that I know of. Since neither hypostatizing of nor primary importance of causal sequence has been demonstrated a more adequate theory of tyle is required. Theorizing of this kind is not popular in our profession, and for good reason; our immediate ancestors badly abused works of art by compressing them into mold of inappropriate stylistic theory. Nevertheless, all our investigative procedures presuppose a theory of style, whether we like it or not. Therefore, if we are to control our procedures rather than being controlled by them it is required of us that we formulate consciously and clearly theory of we want to be committed to. There is, however, a better reason for seeking a more adequate theory of style. I once complimented a colleague n range and penetration of an exam he had made out but, I added, is one question that does not appear here: what is there about this work of art that justifies spending two hours out of anybody's life writing about it? Oh, that's question we don't ask, he replied. Yet, it is question that must be asked and specifically I want to ask it in context of a theory of and not in context of philosophic theories of value. Part of reason we don't raise this question, not only in our writing but also in our teaching, lies precisely in fact that those