Abstract
Wesley C. Salmon Department of Philosophy University of Arizona Mention has been made in of an anticipation by of Quine's existence criterion, and of a possible anticipation of Lewis's definition of strict implication. Although did not, strictly speaking, anticipate Nelson Goodman's famous grue-bleen paradox, first published in a brief note in 1946, did, I believe, publish a discussion of what is, in all essentials, the same problem in Human Knowledge in 1948. Goodman's and Russell's discoveries of this paradox were evidently quite independent of one another. What is quite remarkable, however, is that Russell, in contrast to Goodman, also provided a resolution of the problem -one which I believe to be quite satisfactory. I have discussed this matter in some deta il in Russell on Scientific Inference or Will the Real Deductivist Please Stand Up? section 3, in Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, ed. George Nakhnikian (London: Duckworth, 1974), pp. 188-92. In Goodman's better known presentation, Fact, Fiction and Forecast (1st ed., 1955; 2nd ed. 1965), he seems unaware of the relevance of Russell's solution to his paradox. This strikes me as another example of a widely unappreciated important accomplishment to be found in Russell's work.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
