Abstract
The introduction of performance related pay (PRP) in English schools, following a 1998 Green Paper, was presented as a seamless policy. Incentives for teachers to contribute to performance targets would mean that performance management would be closely linked with the allocation of school budgets. This article traces the problems of implementing this policy stemming from its expenditure implications. The initial criterion-referenced stance adopted by the Government has been progressively abandoned in the light of concerns over the cost of the scheme. As a consequence, the Government has increasingly moved to a policy of imposing limits on access to PRP which threaten to reopen political conflicts over the extent to which PRP is an equitable form of pay determination in schools.
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