Not Passion's Slave

Abstract

Abstract The idea that we are, in some significant sense (and to some significant degree), responsible for our emotions is an idea that Robert Solomon has developed for almost three decades, following the philosophy of Jean‐Paul Sartre. Here, in a single volume, he traces the development of this theory of emotions and develops it in detail. Two themes run through his work: the first presents a “cognitive” theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments. The second proposes an “existentialist” perspective in which he defends the idea that, as we are responsible for our emotions, it follows that – in a limited sense – we “choose” them. While the first premise has gained increasing currency in the literature, his thesis on responsibility has met with considerable resistance: the new emphasis on evolutionary biology and neurology has reinforced the popular prejudice that emotions “happen” to us and are entirely beyond our control. This volume is also a kind of intellectual memoir of Solomon's own development as a thinker. The essays written in the 1980s develop the themes of the “intentionality” of emotion and further elaborate upon the notion of “judgment”; in this period, he is also increasingly preoccupied with how emotions are identified and “read” in a variety of cultures. In the 1990s, his interests revolve around the social and political role of emotion theories and the growing recognition of the social nature of emotions: here he suggests that emotions themselves involve social narratives that go beyond mere social context. The culmination of a 30‐year preoccupation with some of the French thinker's ideas, the final section presents his own (considerably more refined) philosophical position. Despite his own critical assessment of his earlier work, he continues to argue that, in the final analysis, we have control over – and remain essentially responsible for – the emotional and existential quality of our lives.