Not complex enough for complexity: Some intricacies of interpersonal synergies theory

Abstract

Interpersonal coordination (IC) has become an area of growing interest in the last decades. Despite the accumulated evidence, we still do not have an encompassing explanative framework. However, a serious candidate is the interpersonal synergies theory (IST), a model part of the broader complexity approach. In the present paper, we analyze the suitability of IST as an explanation of IC. IST resolves the cognitivist theories’ difficulties on IC, but it exhibits inconsistencies that diminish its impact. We argue that IST can only fit from an epistemological (not an ontological) interpretation of the notion of emergence. Secondly, IST confuses ‘synergy’ with ‘coordination’, risking mixing explanans with explanandum. Third, as a formal theory, IST obliterates the meaning dimension of human movement. Therefore, it is necessary a more in-depth description of what motor coupling among people means. We argue that attending the vitality dynamics sheds light on the shared meaning implied in coordination.