Abstract

Competition between groups is ubiquitous in social and economic life, and groups are typically not created equal. Here we experimentally investigate the implications of this general observation on the unfolding of symmetric and asymmetric competition between groups that are either homogeneous or heterogeneous in the ability of their members to contribute to the success of the group. Our main finding is that, in contrast with a number of theoretical predictions, efforts in contests involving heterogeneous groups are higher than in contests involving only homogeneous groups, leading to reduced earnings (to contest participants) and increased inequality. This effect is particularly pronounced in asymmetric contests, where both homogeneous and heterogeneous groups increase their efforts. We find that asymmetry between groups changes the way group members condition their efforts on those of their peers. Implications for contest designers are discussed.

Highlights

  • Many situations in social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing parties

  • We find that for homogeneous groups, asymmetric contests lead to increased conditional cooperation among group members, while no such effect is observed for heterogeneous groups

  • The current work investigates the effects of withingroup heterogeneity in abilities on behavior in inter-group contests

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Summary

Introduction

Many situations in social and economic life are characterized by rivalry and conflict between two or more competing parties. Within-group heterogeneity in such settings is only natural, as group members can have different skills or abilities It follows that the competing groups themselves are not necessarily similar, resulting in asymmetric competition.. As a workhorse for studying group contests, we follow previous literature by using an experimental version of Tullock’s contest game (Tullock 1980) in which two groups compete for a prize that is divided among all members of the winning party (Katz et al 1990) We study this basic decision situation in three different treatments, in which we systematically vary the heterogeneity both within and between groups.

Model and predictions
The experiment
Results
The effects of contest type on the degree of competition
Group‐ and type‐specific behavior
Efficiency and inequality
Equity norm model
Conclusion

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