Abstract
Abstract This paper discusses the development of ITQs in Norway. Even if some would deny that anything such exists, fisheries management in Norway has some unmistakable characteristics of an ITQ system. Both boatowners and policy makers have discovered the attractions of transferable quotas, the former as a means to increase their private profits, the latter as a vehicle to reduce fleet overcapacity. The slow evolution of transferability is mainly the result of ideological opposition and opposition to structural changes, the latter involving falling number of fishermen, changes in location of the fishing industry, and changed composition of the fishing fleet. The development of this system in the purse seine fleet and the fleet fishing for cod and similar species is traced. Then the concept of resource rent is discussed, as well as how it has become capitalized in quota values, which show up as a rise in value of long term assets of the fishing industry.
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