Northern Ireland, Brexit, and the Interpretation of Self-Determination

Abstract

The legitimacy of the partition of Ireland has been inextricably bound up with interpretations of self-determination. The creation of Northern Ireland following the First World War was just about defensible in terms of the understanding of the principle of national self-determination prevalent at the time. But in the context of the post-colonial emphasis on territory in establishing who was entitled to self-determination, Northern Ireland’s status as a conditional part of the United Kingdom appeared anomalous and facilitated the province’s portrayal as a colonial leftover. The Troubles compounded Northern Ireland’s lack of international legitimacy. In the 1990s there were further changes, including a post–Cold War easing of the anathema against secession. This and other alterations in the interpretation of self-determination meant that Northern Ireland no longer stood out as a relic of imperialism, creating the space for the acceptance of Northern Ireland as an internationally legitimate political entity under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. This favorable external environment for the settlement did not endure. Of the external challenges to the accord, the most serious is Brexit. Its implementation would end what was taken for granted in the 1998 accord, that British and Irish management of the Northern Ireland problem would continue to be facilitated by the two countries’ common interests arising from their membership of the European Union. The article explores the implications of this potential disruption and its bearing on the issue of Irish self-determination.