Abstract

This paper argues that the impact of international developments on the peace process-while difficult to assess-has been exaggerated. Firstly, British policy since the early 1970s has been marked by a considerable degree of continuity, albeit with tactical adjustments. The objectives and the agreements reached in the first peace process (1972-4) and the second peace process (1994-present) are similar and did not require international influence to achieve them. Secondly, the dynamics that produced the peace process were already well under way before the end of the Cold War (1989-91). Thirdly, it was largely shifts within the Republican movement that led to the peace process. Fourthly, where the international dimension was important was in providing the Republican elite with 'stories' to persuade the grass roots to give up armed struggle for unarmed struggle. Fifthly, US intervention was not as strong as is usually thought and to a considerable extent was welcomed by the British government. Finally, the similarities between the Sunningdale Agreement (1973) and the Good Friday Agreement (1998) suggest that the influence of European integration on the peace process has also been exaggerated.

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