Norms, Procedures, and Democratic Legitimacy

Abstract

The overall thrust of the argument points in two opposite directions: it pleads for dimming the contrast commonly drawn between political philosophy and political science but calls for a more radical distinction between the activities of politics and of philosophy, and between its rationality and that of political mediation. Within the first strand of the argument, the fact-value problem is re-examined, whilst within the second strand – the central theme of the article - the operatively legitimizing source of political norms is viewed within a procedural locale that is recognizably democratic, in that its validation is a matter of opinion, of appraisal and reappraisal in and through civic activity itself, and not directly the work of extra-political doctrines that substantively predetermine it. Although not thus preconditioned, procedural democracy is portrayed as being governed by a cognitive and institutional ‘space’ in which the ‘conversion’ of doctrinal ‘isms' issues in ‘performative principles, rather than a regime of pragmatic ad hocism.