Abstract

As discussed in Chapter 4, even the computational study of norms shows a major gap between what is called here the conventionalist and the institutional views. Norms are either seen as products of aggregated individual behaviors: i.e., conventions, or as deliberately issued prescriptions; i.e., laws. In particular, the computational models, in which norms are explicitly modeled, provide a static view where norm emergence and innovation are hardly implemented runtime. A different and more interesting view was presented in Chapter 5, where justice emerged by agents’ gradually “squeezing” one another into an increasingly equitable distribution of labor. However, much like the conventionalist view, the model presented in Chapter 5 gave no account of norms as prescriptions that agents can decide to accept or violate. In the present chapter, a model of norms as obligatory prescriptions is presented, in the attempt to bridge the gap between legal and other types of norms.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.