Normativity I

Abstract

According to Normative Disjunctivism, when an agent is means–ends incoherent, then she either ought not intend the end, ought not believe intending the means is necessary, or ought to intend the means. If this view is true, it might lend support to the idea that means–ends coherence is a myth. The thought is that we’ve made the mistake of confusing a disjunction of requirements of reason for a disjunctive rational requirement (means–ends coherence). This chapter argues that Normative Disjunctivism is false and wouldn’t support the myth theory even if it were true. It presents four separate arguments against Normative Disjunctivism. And the chapter argues that the myth theorist lacks the resources to explain away relevant intuitions about the separateness, and ways of satisfying, the rational requirement of means–ends coherence.