Normativity: A Crucial Kind of Emergence

Abstract

D y n a m i c s y s te m s a p p r o a c h e s ! Normativity Witherington [this issue] argues that the antistructuralist stance of certain dy-namic systems (DS) approaches undermines the essential role of emergence for un-derstanding mental phenomena. If structure is intended to include representation, then we agree. We offer a model of representation that is ultimately grounded in the emergence of normativity in systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium (FFE). A cascade of further emergences provides the essential elements for a fully naturalized account of representation, learning, and development.The DS approach to the study of human development involves a fundamental commitment to the process of ‘emergence through self-organization.’ Witherington [2007, this issue] argues for a rift within DS approaches with respect to the causal status of emergent structure and the legitimacy of formal and final explanations. He argues that the type of DS approach advocated by Thelen and Smith [1994] relies too heavily on the self-organizational principle of ‘global order out of local interactions’ and neglects the efficacy of those ‘global order’ structures per se. For these research-ers, the fact that order (structure) can arise without prescription or plan was the key for rejecting developmental approaches in which the end state (the structure) was presupposed by the process of development itself. Witherington’s main thesis is that the antistructuralism of the Thelen-and-Smith brand of DS ‘threatens to undermine the explanatory significance of DS’s most foundational, unifying principle: emer-gence through self-organization’ [this issue]. If Witherington’s ‘structure’ is intended to include representation, then we agree that DS approaches that ignore or deny the efficacy of emergent organization are incomplete as a meta-theoretical framework for the developmental sciences.