Normative or Non-Normative Marx: How is a Fact-Sensitive Normative Theory Possible?

Abstract

Is it possible for historical materialism to have a specific normative basis that allows the scientific aspects of Marx’s theory to be compatible with his political philosophy and ethics? No consensus has so far been reached on this question. The debate between the normative Marx and the non -normative Marx starts with an acknowledgement of a dichotomy between facts and value. In order to resolve this dichotomy, many studies tend to place value rather than facts at the heart of their arguments – they attempt to demonstrate that Marx explored issues of justice, equality, and liberty at the normative level. However, by drawing on John R. Searle’s answer to the Humean question of ‘is’ and ‘ought’, we can adopt a different approach to the study that puts facts, rather than values, at the heart of the argument. Under this approach, Marx’s analysis of the facts of estrangement, surplus-value, and the like, does not consist of factual statements that exclude value and the scientific theories that result from them. Rather, it consists of the statement of institutional facts that contain values. In Marx’s case, a fact-sensitive normative theory is fully possible.