Abstract

We use normative reasons in a bewildering variety of different ways. And yet, as many recent theorists have shown, one can discern systematic distinctions underlying this complexity. This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics. We aim to bring a black sheep back into the flock: the balancing model of weighing reasons. This model is threatened by a variety of cases in which distinct reasons overlap, in the sense that they do not contribute separate weight for or against an option. Our response is to distinguish between derivative reasons and load-bearing reasons, only the latter of which contribute non-overlapping weight to an option. This distinction is close at hand for analyses of reasons in terms of the promotion of significant outcomes. But we also develop an account of this distinction for fundamentalist theories of normative reasons.

Highlights

  • Since at least 1930, theorists working in ethical theory have explicitly developed constructive accounts of the competing normative considerations that bear on what we ought to do.1 For each option available to an agent in a choice situation,2 there are usually various different reasons in its favour and reasons against

  • This paper is a contribution to this project of constructive normative metaphysics

  • We develop an account of this distinction for fundamentalist theories of normative reasons

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Summary

Introduction

Since at least 1930, theorists working in ethical theory have explicitly developed constructive accounts of the competing normative considerations that bear on what we ought to do. For each option available to an agent in a choice situation, there are usually various different reasons in its favour and reasons against. The challenge is that distinct reasons can overlap, in the sense that they do not contribute separate weight to an option This problem appears in passing in many different discussions of normative reasons, but it has not yet received any sustained discussion.. We both motivate this picture in general, and explore how two important, competing metaphysical accounts of reasons should understand the distinction between load-bearing and derivative reasons in order to successfully explain overlap These two kinds of accounts are Analyses of reasons in terms of the promotion of significant objectives (e.g. values or desires), and Reasons Fundamentalism, according to which there are facts about reasons that do not obtain in virtue of any further normative facts. A sharper account of load-bearing reasons will yield a clear theoretical standard against which to assess creditworthiness.

The set-up
Three kinds of overlap
Differences of grain
Alternative satisfiers
Alternative grounds
Fogal on normative clusters
Metaphysical fundamentality versus normative fundamentality
The analyst’s solution
The Reasons Fundamentalist’s solution
Conclusion

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