Normative explanation unchained

Pekka Väyrynen

doi:10.1111/phpr.12717

Abstract

AbstractNormative theories aim to explain why things have the normative features they have. This paper argues that, contrary to some plausible existing views, one important kind of normative explanations which first‐order normative theories aim to formulate and defend can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of normative facts by non‐normative facts. Normative explanation is plausibly subject to a kind of a justification condition whose satisfaction may fail to transmit along the relevant kind of metaphysical hierarchy. A broader aim of the paper is to contribute to systematic theorizing about normative explanation: whereas there has been a great deal of work on scientific explanation, there has been little by way of systematic exploration of what sort of explanations normative theories aim to formulate and defend.

Highlights

Gender-based wage discrimination is morally wrong because it is arbitrary
A question arises: would it follow that eating dark chocolate is good because dark chocolate is a powerful source of antioxidants? The question I mean to ask here is whether the provision of normative explanation transmits downward along such chains of metaphysical determination
This paper argues that normative explanation can fail to transmit downward along chains of metaphysical determination of the particular normative fact that is being explained

Summary

Introduction

Gender-based wage discrimination is morally wrong because it is arbitrary. Eating dark chocolate is good for us in virtue of how it is pleasurable and healthy. The question I ask when I ask whether the Normative Transmission Principle holds is whether the non-rigged-up sense of ‘because’ in (Trannor/met) expresses a kind of explanation of normative facts which first-order normative theories aim to formulate and defend.

Results

Conclusion