Abstract
There was a time when meta-ethical expressivism seemed to be the only game in town for meta-ethical non-representationalists. In recent years, though, meta-ethical inferentialism has emerged as a promising non-representationalist alternative. So far, however, inferentialists lack something that would really allow them to draw level with expressivists. This is an explanation for the distinctive difference between normative and descriptive vocabulary when it comes to disagreement—something expressivists can explain in terms of the difference between representational and desire-like states and which constitutes one of the primary motivations for expressivism. This paper develops a novel and distinctive account for this difference on behalf of inferentialists, based on the different functions of these two vocabularies. Not only does this account help inferentialists, it also shows how non-representionalist accounts can capture the relevant disagreement phenomena without appealing to the sorts of desire-like states expressivists tend to appeal to.
Highlights
Expressivism has long held the throne of nonrepresentational meta-ethical views
After all, telling us that normative vocabulary is meta-conceptual vocabulary does not tell us in virtue of what normative vocabulary has a semantic inferential role that would account for its difference to descriptive vocabulary when it comes to disagreement
Telling us that normative vocabulary is meta-conceptual vocabulary does not tell us in virtue of what speakers’ would be inclined to interpret use of normative vocabulary in a way that would account for the difference between normative and descriptive vocabulary when it comes to disagreement
Summary
Expressivism has long (relative to meta-ethics’ history) held the throne of nonrepresentational meta-ethical views. For inferentialists the function of normative vocabulary is to allow speakers to take an explicit stand regarding and to discuss the inferential roles of sentences in their language. M-inferentialism’s most prominent and vocal proponent is Chrisman, who argues that m-inferentialism shares expressivism’s benefits, while avoiding its problems He thinks (2011 and 2016: 191–196 and 223–229) that it evades non-naturalism’s worries, because it characterizes normative commitments through ontologically conservative inferential roles. According to Chrisman (2016: 217–222), m-inferentialism fits into a naturalistic world-view and captures plausible connections between normative judgements and action Unlike expressivism, though, it is embedded into a general account of linguistic content, namely inferentialism (Chrisman 2011, 2012, 2016). This brings us to the argument that will be this paper’s focus
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