Normative Behaviourism: An Unconvincing Response to Political Philosophy's Organising Question

Abstract

Normative behaviourism is a method proposed by Jonathan Floyd which uses behavioural trends to produce normative political theory. Certain behaviours are taken to express dissatisfaction with individuals’ circumstances, and national figures are thus used to compare and rank different political systems according to universal human preferences. In this way, normative behaviourism is intended to provide a convincing and meaningful answer to political philosophy’s organising question: how should we live? This dissertation employs the methodology of analytical political philosophy to assess it according to this ambition, finding that it fails due to empirical and philosophical difficulties in the relationship between preferences and behaviours. Chapter 1 presents normative behaviourism within its necessary context by providing a critical discussion of Floyd’s wider analysis of his discipline. Particular focus is placed, firstly, on the ‘mentalism’ thesis, which is affirmed despite an overstatement by Floyd; and secondly, on the nature of justification in matters of political normativity, which is argued to necessarily entail a mentalist thesis. Chapter 2 draws on empirical literature to show that numerous variables impact behaviours in a manner most plausibly external to satisfaction, which suggest that normative behaviourism is likely to produce statistically unreliable results. Chapter 3 shows that grounding normative political theory in preferences only as revealed by behaviours is itself a substantive normative proposal, which is affirmed twice by normative behaviourism: firstly, in dismissing normative thoughts as a relevant aspect of satisfaction; secondly, in affording the outcome of normative behaviourism priority over normative thoughts in answering the organising question. Both instances fail since normative thoughts are inherently compelling and cannot thus be convincingly eliminated from our preferences. Since mentalism fails also, this leads to a scepticism towards the possibility of answers that are both convincing and meaningful. Political philosophers face an inevitable trade-off between these two ideals, analogous to Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle of quantum physics, and it is tentatively suggested that both mentalism, normative behaviourism, and combined approaches might play a role in the discipline moving forward.