Nordic Security Today: Sweden

Abstract

During the 1970s there was a broad domestic political consensus to keep Swedish defense spending at 3.5% of the GNP. Since the defense establishment had been built up during the 1950s and 1960s, when 5% of the GNP was devoted to defense, it was impossible to maintain the same force structure. While the Air Force and the Navy modernized their services, cutting their size in half, the Army kept its force of almost 30 field brigades. The need to place all conscripts in the wartime organization kept the numbers up, but the Army had to compromise on training and weaponry. In the choice between an introvert army oriented strategy and an extrovert navy and air force strategy the Army at first prevailed for political and ideological reasons. Towards the end of the decade this trend was reversed. Sweden decided to develop a new combat aircraft, to modernize the Navy's submarine hunting capability and to improve the mobility and alertness of its field forces. Behind this reversal of policy was the end of detente in Europe and the increased interest and capabilities of the superpowers in Northern Europe. Swedish arms control policy, complementing the defense effort, also moved towards a more European security oriented posture.