Abstract
Ronald Coase asserted that voluntary two-party bargaining with zero transaction costs results in an optimal resource allocation, which is invariant with respect to the liability rule. It has been argued that nonseparabilities destroy the validity of Coase's theorem. In this paper it is shown that this criticism is based on implausible assumptions about the externality-receivers adjustment to the externality level.
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