Non-Rights-Based Arguments

Abstract

OVERVIEW In Section 1.3, I drew a distinction between two different kinds of argument that critics of abortion appeal to in attempting to defend the thesis that abortion, at least in typical cases, is morally impermissible. One kind of argument I called the rights-based argument. This argument turns on two claims: The claim that the fetus (at least in typical cases of abortion) has a right to life, and the claim that if the fetus has a right to life, then abortion (at least in typical circumstances) is morally impermissible. I have now completed my case against the rights-based argument, arguing against the argument's first claim in Chapters 2 and 3 and against the second in Chapter 4. If my arguments against either or both of these claims have been successful, then I have established that the rights–based argument against abortion must be rejected on grounds that the critic of abortion can and does accept. But it remains to consider those arguments against the moral permissibility of abortion that do not commit the critic of abortion to either of these two claims. Such non-rights-based arguments are not affected by anything that has been said in Chapters 2-4 and thus require separate consideration. Arguments against abortion that do not rest on the claim that the fetus has a right to life are not as frequently raised in the philosophical or scholarly literature on abortion, but they have clearly been raised by critics of abortion nonetheless.