Abstract
The explicit consideration of geography in the conflict theory literature is still relatively rare. In this article, two warlords are modeled as being located at opposing ends of a hypothetical line. The model includes variables denoting distance and difficulty of terrain. Each warlord allocates resources to the extraction of natural resources, to the production of goods and services (hence, nonparasitic), and to conflict with the opposing warlord. Two forms of a contest success function, a primary tool in the literature, are used to show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet will win a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. [JEL codes: D74, O17]
Highlights
Since the second world war, at least 158 distinct armed conflicts have been recorded, with close to 41 million civilian and military deaths, a toll that exceeds the entire current population of Argentina
Conflicts differ in terms of scope, structure, and method and the conflict theory literature distinguishes among conflict types: intrastate, interstate, extrastate, nonstate, insurgency, civil war and so on
Models of insurgency have focused on both territorial expansion and the effect that conflict has on geographic location of insurgence
Summary
Jack Hirshleifer states: “As in all attempts to model complex phenomena, the necessity of making a host of special assumptions limits the applicability of the results obtained [and] in particular ... [t]he effect of distance or other geographical factors have not been considered ... and are not really fundamental.” he eventually acknowledged it, at the time Hirshleifer ignored Kenneth Boulding’s geographic model, pioneered decades earlier. This article presents two models wherein two nonparasitic warlords, who are geographically connected, must decide on the amount of resources to be dedicated to conflict and the amount to be dedicated to production. The model can be adjusted such that only a portion, dependent on the location of the conflict point, of a warlord’s production is under threat of appropriation. One could advance current research on the choice of weaponry and, destruction by applying the added variable of geographical distance It is imperative, that more research be put into understanding both what defines the conflict point and where warlords choose to establish their territorial stronghold..
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