Abstract
One of the attributes necessary for Watson to be considered human is that it must be conscious. From Rachlin's (2012) point of view, that of teleological behaviorism, consciousness refers to the organization of behavioral complexity in which overt behavior is distributed widely over time. Thus, a computer such as Watson could be considered to be conscious if it behaves like a conscious person. This last point is critical because of the implications that it holds for philosophy of mind. For a behaviorist, consciousness is not required to be internal event, nor is it self-evident that the mind resides inside of us. Consciousness is instead something that humans do, or achieve, in their overt and covert actions (Schlinger, 2008). Rachlin believes that if it were possible to generate the same actions using a different mechanism, the behavior would be no less conscious than our current behavior. This is because consciousness is not part of the mechanism responsible for the behavior, it is the behavior itself.
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